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BOOK NOTICE
A TIME FOR PRESIDENTIAL POWER?
WAR TIME AND THE CONSTRAINED
EXECUTIVE
David Levine*
WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES. By Mary L.
Dudziak. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 2012. Pp. 136.
$24.95.
INTRODUCTION
Between 2002 and 2008 I served as an intelligence officer in the U.S.
Air Force. Though I had been deployed overseas several times, my primary
place of duty was in the United States. When I landed at Baghdad Interna-
tional Airport in June 2006, however, several things immediately changed
for me as a result of military regulations. I had to carry my sidearm and dog
tags at all times. I could not eat anywhere other than a U.S. military installa-
tion. I could not drink alcohol. My pay was a bit higher. Personally, I was
more vigilant, more aware of my surroundings. In other words, I was at war.
Indeed, the U.S. government claimed wartime powers because thou-
sands of others like me-members of the U.S. military-were stationed in
Iraq: the United States deployed large numbers of troops to provisional ba-
ses on foreign soil, those troops used lethal force, and they detained
individuals without trial for using force in return. And while there was a
reasonably clear beginning point for the exercise of these powers-found in
an Authorization for the Use of Military Force ("AUMF") rather than a for-
mal declaration of war'-from the vantage point of June 2006, it was.
unclear whether or when this authority would cease. There was no enemy
that could surrender or sign a peace treaty, or give some other sign that
"war" had ended; the forces that the United States was fighting-variously,
Sunni tribesmen, Shia militias, and foreign extremists-had changed signif-
icantly since the 2003 invasion and would even change during my yearlong
deployment. Although, as an officer in the U.S. military, it was very clear for
me when I was at war and when I was not, the temporal bounds of this
* Law Clerk, Honorable Michael S. Kanne, United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit; J.D., May 2012, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank
Ceridwen Cherry, Julian Davis Mortenson, and Joan Larsen for the thoughtful assistance and
feedback they provided while this piece was conceived and written. I would also like to extend
a special thanks to Christiana Martenson, Rachel Ezzell, Kimberly Ang, and the Michigan
Law Review staff for their excellent assistance throughout the process.
1. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498.
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"wartime" were actually quite murky for the U.S. government. That murki-
ness increased significantly when considering not only the war in Iraq but
also the "Global War on Terror" writ large.
Professor Mary L. Dudziak's important new book War Time' confronts
the murkiness between wartime and peacetime, investigating its history,
present reality, and implications. Although the boundaries of the War on
Terror are commonly perceived as shifting and uncertain, especially com-
pared to relatively defined wars such as World War II, Dudziak argues that
the murky boundaries of war are not a new phenomenon and highlights the
corrosive effects that such uncertainty can have on the rule of law. She
argues that this uncertainty will accelerate as the United States engages in
increasingly amorphous armed conflicts. She likewise predicts that politi-
cal leaders-particularly executive branch officials-will try to take
advantage of wartime's uncertain boundaries while using the terminology
of a more certain past.
Dudziak contends that the increasing invocation of wartime as an argu-
ment for increased executive power runs counter to the conception of the
United States as a nation of laws. She suggests that we need to understand
the flawed rationale behind such invocations to effectively combat them.
Part I of this Notice summarizes Dudziak's work, tracing the development
of the modem concept of "wartime" from World War II to the present day.
Parts II and III evaluate Dudziak's arguments in light of two of the most
extraordinary powers that a state may claim in wartime-the power to detain
and the power to project force. Part II argues that, for all of Dudziak's con-
cerns about the diminishing barriers between peacetime and wartime, there
still exist some hard limits on the power that the executive may claim, as
evidenced by U.S. detention policies in Iraq. But while some limits may still
apply, Part III also finds truth in Dudziak's premise that wartime's bounda-
ries are eroding, using the recent U.S. intervention in Libya as an example.
Part III also examines the limits to Dudziak's paradigm, under which war-
time necessarily equals government power, against the backdrop of a
president who has expanded his power by conspicuously avoiding "war-
time." While arguing that the relationship between war and executive power
is more nuanced than War Time might let on, this Notice nonetheless con-
cludes that Dudziak's book is compelling and raises very real concerns
about the future of executive power.
I. DOES WARTIME EXIST?
Dudziak argues that the idea of wartime has undergone a dramatic shift
in the last century: American presidents have claimed war powers in an in-
creasing variety of situations, while ignoring the traditional temporal limits
that make such expansive powers palatable in the first place. War Time's
2. Mary L. Dudziak is the Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law and the Director of
the Project on War and Security in Law, Culture, and Society, Emory University School of
Law.
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chapters track that evolution. Consequently, Part I of this Notice proceeds
chronologically through various incarnations of "war" that have arisen over
the last 100 years.
A. War as Time
During wartime, Dudziak writes, "we expect the rules to change," but
we also expect that "by definition, wartime comes to an end" (p. 15). War-
time is a discrete period, one with finite boundaries, that dovetails almost
precisely with its converse: peacetime (p. 16).
It is in this perceived stark divide between wartime and peacetime, ac-
cording to Dudziak, that we find a rationale and reassurance for the legal
changes that are seen as necessary during wartime. Law during wartime
"afford[s] less protection to civil liberties and giv[es] more deference to ex-
ecutive power" (p. 16). However, because "we share a belief that this
moment will end decisively," the shift toward a powerful executive is broad-
ly accepted (p. 22).
Dudziak notes, though, that the view of wartime as temporary and ex-
ceptional is only accurate if one gerrymanders the definition, ignoring
numerous smaller conflicts to which the United States has been a party.' In
particular, she notes a disconnect between the public perception of war-
time-a temporary, limited affair-and the reality of military operations
over the twentieth century. Dudziak uses a chart to illustrate just how filled
with "wartime" the twentieth century was for the United States, and puts to
rest the notion that wartime has been limited or temporary (p. 29). The
boundary between wartime and peacetime, then, is more porous than the
American public might believe. Even the apparently clear cases-wars with
surrender ceremonies and parades-reveal, upon closer examination, a ra-
ther muddy divide between war and peace.
B. A Big War with Uncertain Boundaries
Dudziak observes that "World War II is thought of as having obvious
starting and ending points: an abrupt beginning at Pearl Harbor and a clear
end when the Japanese surrendered after the United States dropped atomic
bombs." (pp. 35-36). She then identifies no fewer than six plausible choices
for an "actual" end date.4
Identifying the proper start date for World War II (from the American
perspective) is similarly troubling. Although the 1941 Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declaration of war provide an easy marker,
Dudziak points out that President Roosevelt began exercising what we
3. P. 26. Among others, these include conflicts in Bocas del Toro, Haiti, and Grenada.
4. Pp. 37-38. In chronological order, these are Germany's surrender on May 8, 1945;
Japan's announcement of its decision to surrender on August 14, 1945; Japan's signing of the
surrender documents on September 2, 1945; President Truman's declaration of the cessation
of hostilities on December 31, 1946; the ending of the legal state of war with Germany in July
of 1951; and the peace treaty with Japan that went into effect on April 28, 1952.
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might consider "war powers" much earlier. Starting in 1938, Roosevelt by-
passed Congress in order to implement several defense programs that he
found necessary after Axis aggression became apparent (p. 41). Roosevelt,
or more specifically, Robert Jackson, Roosevelt's attorney general (and a
later Supreme Court justice), justified these actions under the president's
commander-in-chief powers (pp. 42-43). Even when Roosevelt went to
Congress, the result was a significant grant of power to the executive. For
example, the 1941 Lend-Lease Act gave the president the power to provide
war equipment and supplies to "any country whose defense the President
deem[ed] vital to the defense of the United States. '5 Seen in this light, the
actual beginning of World War II is less clear.
The upshot of all of this murkiness for Dudziak is that the legal conse-
quences of "wartime" extended beyond what might traditionally be thought
of as the temporal boundaries of World War II. In Lee v. Madigan,6 a murder
case, the legal issue before the Supreme Court hinged on whether the coun-
try was still at war in 1949, the year during which the murder occurred.7 In
1948 the Court had stated, "War does not cease with a cease-fire order, and
power to be exercised by the President ... is a process which begins when
war is declared but is not exhausted when the shooting stops."8 The govern-
ment argued in Lee that that executive power still had life in 1949.9 By the
time the Court decided Lee in 1959, it was "common sense" that the crime
had been committed during peacetime (pp. 39-40), but Dudziak marshals
many other instances of legal repercussions stretching out on either side of
the 1941-1945 timeframe.
Among these examples, Dudziak describes myriad restrictions on civil
liberties and the imposition of domestic surveillance programs by Congress
and the executive in the late 1930s. 10 She notes the Court's complicity in
placing the country in a more warlike legal framework, citing the upholding
of a compulsory flag-salute statute in Minersville School District v. Gobitis1'
in 1940.12 Dudziak similarly finds traces of "wartime" post-1945 in the
5. An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, ch. 11, 55 Stat. 31, 31 (1941)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 411-423).
6. 358 U.S. 228 (1959).
7. Pp. 33-40. The defendant in Lee was an enlisted member of the army who was
convicted by court-martial of murdering a fellow soldier. Simply put, if the crime had oc-
curred during wartime, the death penalty was available; if the crime had occurred during
peacetime, it was not.
8. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 167 (1948).
9. P. 38 ("Because [Article 92] remained in effect, the government argued that the
nation was 'not then in time of peace for the purpose of Article 92.'").
10. See pp. 44-45, 53-54 (discussing domestic surveillance), 54-58 (discussing the
restriction of civil liberties).
11. 31OU.S.586(1940).
12. See pp. 56-58. Dudziak also notes, however, that the Court came to a contrary con-
clusion-that compulsory flag saluting was unconstitutional-in a subsequent case decided
after the declaration of war. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
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Court's deference to executive detention power after "the shooting stops" in
Ludecke v. Watkins,13 and its decision that Congress's invocation of war
powers in enacting a 1947 rent control statute was appropriate in Woods v.
Cloyd W. Miller Co.14 Having debunked the myth of a clean beginning and
end to World War II, Dudziak next sets her sights on the Cold War.
C. The Cold War as the Beginning of Permanent "Wartime"
Dudziak notes that the status of the Cold War as a proper "war" was
(and is) deeply uncertain; many of the confrontations were certainly "not the
sort of battle imagined by Clausewitz.' 1 5 Despite the sources and scholars
she surveys, Dudziak is unable to reach a conclusion about whether the Cold
War was a war (pp. 72-76). Even Congress, she notes, is split on whether to
implicitly recognize it by issuing campaign medals for heroism displayed
during the Cold War (pp. 74-75).
The ambiguous status of the Cold War led to dubious contractions of
civil liberties in the 1950s when the conflict was at its height. Dudziak prof-
fers as examples the red-baiting of McCarthyism and the prosecution of in-
individuals for what were essentially "thought crimes" under the Smith Act
(pp. 77-78). She notes the prevailing sentiment among scholars that the
Cold War was a low point for First Amendment protections (p. 80). But she
also recognizes the countervailing forces at play: that international condem-
nation of racial segregation led to the integration of the military and public
schools (pp. 84-85).
For Dudziak, the Korean War-an undeclared, never formally ended war
that brought about a significant expansion of executive power-is a better
parallel for the current, ambiguous War on Terror. The Korean War ushered
in "the national security state" (pp. 92-93), a development more important
to the modern wartime legal framework than any individual statute or case.
The military budget, notes Dudziak, went from $14 billion in 1949 to $53
billion in 1953 (p. 89). By invoking a war without end, she argues, Ameri-
ca's political leaders put the country on a "permanent war footing" (p. 93)
and consolidated executive branch power through budgetary might (p. 89).
Dudziak finds in the Korean War an important precursor to this century's
War on Terror.
(1943). She explains this, as well as Justice Jackson's antitotalitarian rhetoric in the case, as a
reaction to wartime in its own right. P. 60.
13. See 335 U.S. 160, 167-72 (1948).
14. See 333 U.S. 138, 141-44 (1948).
15. P. 65. Carl von Clausewitz was a nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist
known for developing a philosophy of war as it existed in the Napoleonic era. See generally
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans., Princeton
Univ. Press 1984) (1832).
1199April 2013]
Michigan Law Review
D. A Never Ending War
As with the Cold War, the legal status of the War on Terror is deeply
confusing and ambiguous; as Dudziak observes, "[T]he words 'terrorism'
and 'war' had not been conflated" previously (p. 100). But, she argues,
President Bush harnessed familiarity during highly uncertain times by using
traditional terminology: in the immediate aftermath of September 11, he
declared the conflict a war, albeit "a new kind of war" (pp. 100-01; internal
quotation marks omitted). Dudziak notes too President Bush's very early
recognition that traditional temporal boundaries would not apply to this new
war.16 The effect of this recognition was "a lack of fit between the conceptu-
al categories of wartime and peacetime" (p. 113).
The traditional wartime gloss President Bush put on the War on Terror
led to a slackening of legal constraints, despite the war's lack of temporal
boundaries. The result was a virtually unbound executive. Vice President
Cheney asked the government, in Dudziak's words, to operate on "the dark
side" (p. 104; internal quotation marks omitted). John Yoo invoked wartime
as a rationale for allowing President Bush to approve coercive, perhaps tor-
turous, interrogations (p. 106). President Bush claimed the power to hold
foreign nationals, without charge, for an indefinite period of time at Guan-
tanamo Bay. Because "the basic temporal structure (normal times, ruptured
by nonnormal times) largely remained in place in legal thought" (p. 114),
these invocations of wartime served both legal and normative arguments.
Wartime detention is not punishment, and so constraints we might normally
put on criminal incarcerations do not apply, for instance. And because war-
time is so extraordinary and the stakes are so high, the public should not
want the constraints to apply.
Not even the Supreme Court was immune from this logic, Dudziak ar-
gues. In the first major case to test post-September 11 limits on executive
power-Hamdi v. Rumsfeld-a plurality of the Court held that the president
could detain individuals determined to be "enemy combatants."' 7 He had
this power, the Court reasoned, precisely because of the wartime framework,
which the Court considered appropriate (p. 121). The Court's understanding
of the wartime at issue was a manifestly conventional one: these were ex-
ceptional circumstances that would undoubtedly pass. 8
When the circumstances had not passed four years later, the Court seem-
ingly reconsidered the wisdom of an unbound commander-in-chief. In
Boumediene v. Bush, the Court seemed intensely skeptical of executive
power and gave the Guantanamo detainees access to habeas corpus proceed-
ings in U.S. courts. 9 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion for a divided Court
16. See p. 103 (" 'We are at war,' he told them, 'and we will stay at war until this is
done.' ").
17. 542 U.S. 507, 516-24 (2004) (plurality opinion).
18. Pp. 121-22. The Court portentously noted, however, that "[i]f the practical circum-
stances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the
development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
19. See 553 U.S. 723, 739-71 (2008).
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took particular notice of the lack of temporal constraints, reasoning that ha-
beas was necessary because of the potentially dire consequences for
individuals detained "for the duration of [the] conflict."
20
Dudziak concludes her brief survey of the Court's War on Terror juris-
prudence by analyzing the return of deference to the executive. In Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, the Court upheld a statute criminalizing material
support to groups categorized as "terrorist. 21 And though Dudziak notes
that "the term 'war on terror' does not appear in the opinions" (p. 125), con-
cerns over national security and wartime objectives certainly animated the
decision.22 Indeed, she suggests, the Court looked past the concept of "war-
time" altogether and recognized war or conflict (necessitating broader
powers) as a now-permanent feature of modern life (p. 127).
Dudziak's arguments crystalize in her conclusion. She identifies "war-
time" as a rhetorical device useful for those who would impose extreme
measures, rather than an objective description of the world (p. 136). And she
prescribes "a citizenry attentive to the exercise of military power" in order to
"[k]eep[] the war powers in check" (p. 136).
Implicit in that prescription is the notion that the American polity has so
far failed at that task-that, by and large, the president is currently unre-
strained in his exercise of war powers. Indeed, in a recent New York Times
op-ed, Dudziak says almost exactly that: "[President Obama's] expansive
definition of war leaves in place the executive power to detain without
charges, and to exercise war powers in any region where Al Qaeda has a
presence."23 The remainder of this Notice explores that charge: whether the
modern president is unconstrained in his exercise of war powers, and
whether the outmoded, conventional understanding of "wartime" is to
blame.
II. DAQDUQ AND THE POWER TO DETAIN
This Part argues that the law continues to constrain the modern execu-
tive even while it exercises a core wartime function--detention-using the
case of Ali Musa Daqduq as an illustration. Daqduq, a Lebanese national
thought to be a senior operative in Lebanese Hizb'allah, was captured by
U.S. forces in Iraq in March 2007 and accused of planning a 2007 kidnap-
ping operation during which five U.S. soldiers were killed.24 Consistently
referred to as the "highest profile" U.S. detainee in Iraq,25 Daqduq served as
20. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
21. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2715-31 (2010).
22. See p. 126.
23. Mary L. Dudziak, This War Is Not Over Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2012, at A3 1.
24. John F. Bums & Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Says Iran Helped Iraqis Kill Five G.L's,
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2007, at Al.
25. Phil Stewart & Suadad al-Saihy, As Troops Leave, U.S. Seeks Custody of Key Iraq




a public link between international terror groups and the Shia insurgency
that flourished during the middle years of the decade.
Daqduq was also, however, a consistent source of tension between the
United States, Iran, Lebanon, and the Shia-dominated Iraqi government.
This was never more true than during the final drawdown of troops at the
end of 2011. As President Obama pushed to meet a pullout deadline set by
his predecessor, Iraq demanded that Daqduq be turned over, while congres-
sional Republicans argued strenuously that Daqduq should remain in U.S.
custody, preferably at Guantanamo Bay. Although much of the official anal-
ysis that eventually led the United States to hand Daqduq over to Iraq re-
remains beyond public view, an examination of the forces that influenced
this decision provides insight into Dudziak's central thesis.
The Status of Forces Agreement ("SOFA") concluded in late 2008 be-
tween the United States and Iraq, sets out clear, if limited, guidance on the
status of detainees. 26 Pursuant to Article Four of the Agreement, the United
States could not detain any person except "in the conduct of operations
against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, outlaw groups, and remnants of
the former regime. '27 This broad category included Daqduq. Even when
U.S. detention was authorized, "such persons must be handed over to com-
petent Iraqi authorities within 24 hours" of their capture.28 Iraq, however,
was allowed to "request assistance from the United States Forces in detain-
ing or arresting wanted individuals." 9 Further, the Agreement provided that
"[all the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later
than December 31, 2011.30
The combined force of these provisions left three alternatives for detain-
ees, such as Daqduq, whom the United States still held at the end of 2011.
Such individuals could have been turned over to the government of Iraq to
be charged and sentenced in accordance with Iraqi law; Iraq could have con-
tinued to request American detention assistance; or, provided the U.S.
government could charge detainees with specific crimes, they could have
been extradited and prosecuted in accordance with normal criminal proce-
dures in U.S. courts.
31
26. Agreement on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organiza-
tion of Their Activities During Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008,
Hein's No. KAV 8551 [hereinafter SOFA]. SOFA's relevant provisions all took effect at the
time of its signing.
27. Id. art. 4, § 1.
28. Id. art. 22, § 2.
29. Id. art. 22, § 3. Since Daqduq remained in U.S. custody until the withdrawal, this
was presumably the legal basis for that arrangement. Iraq would have been alerted to his pres-
ence under Article 22, § 4 of the SOFA, provided that the United States gave the Iraqi
government "available information" on every detainee it held as of November 2008.
30. Id. art. 24, § 1.
31. Commentators have raised the possibility that Daqduq could have been tried by a
U.S. military commission in Iraq prior to 2011, a theoretical fourth option. See, e.g., Robert
Chesney, The Daqduq Mess: Apportion Blame Widely, LAWFARE (Dec. 20, 2011, 12:20 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.con/2011/12/the-daqduq-mess-apportion-blame-widely/. That was
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Beyond the narrow question of whether Daqduq's detention was in ac-
cordance with SOFA, whether the United States would have had a legal
basis for holding Daqduq following withdrawal was ambiguous. The AUMF,
passed by Congress in 2002, gave the president the power "to use the Armed
Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropri-
ate" in response to threats in Iraq.32 Interpreting similar language in the
AUMF enacted in the aftermath of September 11, the Hamdi Court found
that "capture and detention" of combatants was a "fundamental and accept-
ed ... incident [of] war" and that such action must therefore be a "necessary
and appropriate" use of force.
33
But in discussing the possible contours of this "fundamental incident of
war" the Court stated that "[i]t is a clearly established principle of the law
of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities. '34 The "ac-
tive hostilities" boundary called into question the United States' ability to
detain Daqduq under AUMF authorization following the disengagement of
U.S. forces from Iraq.
35
Despite these clear legal impediments, there were calls by American
politicians and commentators for the United States to retain custody of
Daqduq after all U.S. forces had withdrawn from Iraq.36 Most such argu-
ments sounded in themes that resonate in Dudziak's book-that the United
States would, despite withdrawing, still be at war and that the president
should invoke those circumstances to maneuver around the law. Senator
Lindsey Graham, during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, questioned
Attorney General Eric Holder on the Daqduq situation and stressed his pref-
erence that the United States retain custody:
Mr. Attorney General, I have tried to be as supportive as I know how to be
in creating flexibility for the executive branch and not micromanage the
war ....
perhaps possible, though beyond the scope of this Notice, which focuses on President
Obama's options in late 2011.
32. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L.
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498, 1501.
33. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion).
34. Id. at 520.
35. The applicability of Hamdi presumes that Daqduq was held pursuant to the Iraq
AUMF. One could make an argument that the United States was actually holding Daqduq
pursuant to the Global War on Terror AUMF, and that therefore his continued detention was
authorized. However, substantial links between al-Qaeda and Lebanese Hizb'allah are not well
established, and the likelihood that a court would have accepted this argument, given that
Daqduq was detained during a use of force authorized by the Iraq AUMF, is low.
Separately, the conclusion that Daqduq was held pursuant to the Iraq AUMF presumes
that there was not some other rationale for holding Daqduq (i.e., Daqduq committing an of-
fense for which he could be punished). Although that particular debate is beyond the scope of
this Notice, there is a strong argument that he could have been categorized as an unprivileged
combatant and held liable for his crimes (assuming a way around the SOFA-based arguments).
36. See Stewart & al-Salhy, supra note 25; Editorial, The Daqduq Disgrace, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 17, 2011, at A14.
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*.. [I]f we ... turn him over to the Iraqis, that is just like letting him
go. I think this would be a huge mistake .... [I]t would be a national dis-
grace to allow this guy to escape justice ....
... [Slubmit to this Committee or me individually a plan ... that
would be reasonable, sound, and has political support to confine future
captures and to move people out of Iraq and Afghanistan who are too dan-
gerous to let go.
7
Some conservative commentators went a step further and argued that, if
Iraq would not agree to Daqduq remaining in U.S. custody, President
Obama should unilaterally transfer him to Guantanamo Bay.38 Implicit in
both Senator Graham's statement and these commentators' views is that the
country would remain at war and, as a result, the president would continue
to have the power to detain Daqduq. This expansion of presidential power is
the logical conclusion that War Time predicts: as wartime becomes normal-
ized, the idea that temporal marking posts should constrain executive power
seems quaint and impractical.
But President Obama did not claim unrestrained power in this instance.
The United States gave up physical custody of Ali Musa Daqduq-as it had
with every other detainee in Iraq-to the Iraqi government.39 Although there
has been speculation that he may yet be extradited to face some form of mil-
itary commission or civilian trial in the United States," during the summer
of 2012, Daqduq was cleared in an Iraqi court of terrorism and forgery
charges, and extradition requests by the United States were denied.4 ' Paying
consideration to Dudziak's thesis, it is worth reflecting on why the Daqduq
situation has played out in this manner.
While Dudziak is, in some respects, accurate in characterizing the end of
the Iraq War as unsatisfyingly ambiguous,42 in this instance "wartime" did
37. Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 112th Cong. 21-22 (2011) (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham, Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary).
38. See David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Charles D. Stimson, Op-Ed., Obama and the Hezbollah
Terrorist, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2011, at A19; see also Robert Chesney, Cully Stimson on the
Daqduq Situation, LAWFARE (Dec. 23, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2011/12/cully-stimson-on-the-daqduq-situation/ (posting essay submitted by Stimson).
39. Charlie Savage, U.S. Transfers Last Prisoner to Iraqi Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2011, at All.
40. E.g., Robert Chesney, Might Daqduq Face a Military Commission One Day After
All?, LAWFARE (Feb. 24, 2012, 10:31 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/might-
daqduq-face-a-military-commission-one-day-after-all/.
41. Lara Jakes & Qassim Abdul-Zahra, Iraq Blocks US Extradition for Hezbollah
Commander, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 2, 2012, available at http://www.seattlepi.com/
news/article/Iraq-blocks-US-extradition-for-Hezbollah-commander-3756679.php.
42. See pp. 127-32. She notes, for instance, that the Associated Press refused to
acknowledge that combat operations had ended, and that the Department of Defense continued
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have a concrete termination date, which itself had concrete legal effects. The
Obama Administration took seriously the temporal boundary dictated by
statute (SOFA) and broader international law concepts (the "active hostili-
ties" boundary noted by the Hamdi Court). President Obama did not try to
extend his authority to detain, one of his most important war powers, even in
the face of calls to do So43 and domestic political opposition to his deci-
sion. 44 And if we take the statements of President Obama's advisors
seriously, attentiveness to the law and the constraints that the law imposes
were primary reasons why this decision was made.
45
President Obama's actions imply that time and law are still bound up
with one another, that they function as important constraints on presidential
exercise of the war powers, and that we might still be able to distinguish
"wartime" from "peacetime." President Obama did not try to invoke "war-
time" as "an argument for extraordinary governance" (p. 136). This was true
even given the myriad ambiguities of the Iraq situation. Law, in multiple
forms and for multiple reasons, constrained executive power despite poten-
tial political costs.
A similar story, with law and time constraining executive power, is play-
ing out in Afghanistan. With the United States planning to pull out of
Afghanistan by 2014, most indicators point to the United States permanent-
ly handing over detention operations to the Afghan government, as it did in
Iraq.4 6 To be sure, the Afghan situation will test this counternarrative to
Dudziak far more than Iraq did: the Afghan government is less dependable
than its Iraqi counterpart, 47 and those detained in Afghanistan were detained
under the post-September 11 AUMF, a potentially much broader authority.
48
Still, it is worth noting that, at least with respect to detention, the erosion of
to award combat pay and medals to soldiers deployed to Iraq even after the official pullout
date.
43. See Letter from Senator John McCain et al. to Sec'y of Def. Leon Panetta (July 21,
2011), available at http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&
FileStoreid=58d62902-c347-49fl-bfed-255e1527adc7.
44. Savage, supra note 39.
45. During the December 16, 2011 White House Daily Press Briefing, Jay Carney, the
Press Secretary, for instance, made the point several times that the Administration was intent
on dealing with the case "in accordance with both U.S. and Iraqi law." Press Briefing by Jay
Carney, White House Press Sec'y (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2011/12/16/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-camey-12162011. That alone
might be thin support, but I find the political calculus convincing. This decision invited poten-
tially damaging conflict (with little in the way of reward), allowing opponents to use the
episode as evidence of the president's weakness on national security, in a way a different deci-
sion would not have.
46. See Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. -Afghanistan Talks Falter Despite Leeway on Detention
Facilities, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 5, 2012, atA4.
47. See Matthew Rosenberg & Graham Bowley, Intractable Afghan Graft Hampering
U.S. Strategy, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012, at Al.
48. Those terms and authorities were recently re-ratified by Congress in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011),




temporal boundaries that concerns Dudziak has not manifested itself in the
complete destruction of constraints on executive war powers. President
Obama has felt bound to act in accordance with a more "traditional" view of
wartime, including relinquishing some powers when the switch flips back to
''peacetime."
III. LIBYA AND THE POWER TO PROJECT MILITARY FORCE
Although the Obama Administration arguably feels the constraint of law
in exercising the detention power, it is also trying to manipulate the defini-
tion of wartime. The Administration's employment of rhetoric to justify the
use of force abroad-particularly its attempt to redefine the word "hostili-
ties" in the Libya context-is in many ways consistent with the narrative
Dudziak presents. This rhetoric, however, also exposes the conceptual limits
of Dudziak's work. While previous presidents have attempted to expand
wartime in the pursuit of increased power, President Obama has tried to lim-
it wartime in order to increase his prerogative.
Both the Declare War Clause49 and the War Powers Resolution" give
Congress some control over exactly when "wartime" exists. While the U.S.
military was deployed to Libya during the spring and summer of 2011, the
Obama Administration advanced the argument that, under the circumstanc-
es, it was bound by neither clause.5 If Dudziak is worried about "war's
presence as an ongoing feature of American democracy" (p. 136), Libya is a
potent case study with implications for the use of force over the coming
decades.
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants to Congress the pow-
er to "declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water.'5 2 Although there is substantial
debate on the precise scope of these powers,53 this clause at least provides
some measure of congressional control over significant commitments of
U.S. forces to battle. However, it has long been accepted that presidents,
acting pursuant to the commander-in-chief power, may "introduce[] armed
forces into situations in which they encounter[], or risk[] encountering, hos-
tilities, but which [are] not 'wars' in either the common meaning or the
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
50. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006).
51. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
112th Cong. 7-17 (2011) [hereinafter Libya and War Powers Hearing] (statement of Harold
Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State) ("[T]his administration is acting lawfully,
consistent with both the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution.");
Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 2011 WL 1459998, at *12 (O.L.C. Apr. 1, 2011)
("[W]e do not believe that anticipated United States operations in Libya amounted to a 'war'
in the constitutional sense necessitating congressional approval under the Declaration of War
Clause.").
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1I.
53. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & John Yoo, Congress at War, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2,
2007), http://www.latimes.com/la-op-dustup2aprO2,0,2350819.story.
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constitutional sense. 54 Successive administrations have adopted some vari-
ant of that view and have invariably deployed U.S. forces abroad in a limited
manner based on this inherent authority.55
The Obama Administration has adopted this position-that a president
has inherent constitutional authority to deploy forces outside of war-and
even sought to clarify it. In the Office of Legal Counsel's ("OLC") memo to
President Obama on the authority to use military force in Libya,56 the
Administration acknowledged that the Declare War Clause is a "possible
constitutionally-based limit on ... presidential authority to employ military
force. '57 The memo reasoned that the Constitution speaks only to Congress's
ability to shape engagements that are "wars," and that presidents have de-
ployed forces in limited contexts from the earliest days of the Union.58
Acknowledging those facts, the memo concluded that the constitutional lim-
it on congressional power must be the conceptual line between war and not
war. In locating this boundary, the memo looked to the "anticipated nature,
scope, and duration" of the conflict to which President Obama was introduc-
ing forces.59 OLC found that the "war" standard "will be satisfied only by
prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving expo-
sure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial
period"
' 60
The Obama Administration's position was not out of sync with previous
presidential practice-the Declare War Clause did not require congressional
approval prior to executive deployment of troops. In analyzing the "nature,
scope, and duration" questions, the memo looked first to the type of mis-
sions that U.S. forces would be engaged in. The air missions envisioned for
the Libya operation did not pose the threat of withdrawal difficulty or esca-
lation risk that might indicate "a greater need for approval [from Congress]
at the outset."61 The nature of the mission, then, was not similar to full
"war." Similarly, the scope of the intended operation was primarily limited,
at the time the memo was written, to enforcing a no-fly zone. 62 Consequent-
54. Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 Op. O.L.C.
327, 331 (1995).
55. E.g., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, supra note 51.
56. OLC often writes memoranda analyzing the constitutionality of potential presiden-
tial action. Despite its status as an executive branch office, it often acts as an independent,
quasi-judicial check on the presidency, and its opinions are therefore accorded great weight
within both the judicial system and academic literature. See, e.g., Walter E. Dellinger et al.,
PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL (Dec. 21, 2004), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty-scholarship/2302.
57. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, supra note 51, at *8.
58. See id. (citing Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statuto-
ry Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 187 (1980)).
59. Id. at *8 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id. at *13 (alteration in original) (quoting Proposed Deployment of United States




ly, the operation's expected duration was not long. Thus, concluded OLC,
"the use of force by the United States in Libya [did not rise] to the level of a
'war' in the constitutional sense. '63 While this conclusion may have been
uncontroversial, it highlights Dudziak's concerns over the manipulation of
the idea of "wartime," concerns that were heightened by the Obama Admin-
istration's War Powers Resolution analysis.
Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973 in an attempt to
rein in executive power in the wake of the Vietnam War.64 The resolution
provides that the president shall "in every possible instance.., consult with
Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances ' 65 Additionally, when the president sends U.S. forces
"into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated," the resolution requires him to submit a report to Con-
gress describing the circumstances of the deployment and the expected
involvement of U.S. troops in the "hostilities. '66 Within sixty days of receiv-
ing that report, Congress must either declare war or in some other way
extend the deployment; in the absence of some ratifying action, the resolu-
tion requires that the president withdraw U.S. forces.67
Though eschewing the plainly confrontational route of directly challeng-
ing Congress's power under the War Powers Resolution, the Obama
Administration implicitly challenged Congress's ability to affect future op-
erations. In declining to withdraw forces, despite Congress's lack of
approving legislation, President Obama claimed that the conflict in Libya
could not be deemed "hostilities" as that term is used in the resolution. This
argument was made both in a letter to Congress during the summer of
201168 and in congressional testimony given by Harold Koh, the State De-
partment Legal Advisor under the Obama Administration. 69
63. Id.
64. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006). Section 1541(a) states the
following:
It is the purpose of this chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution
of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and
the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hos-
tilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities
or in such situations.
Id. § 1541(a); see also Harold H. Koh, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 39 (1990)
("Congress passed the War Powers Resolution to prevent future Vietnams, undeclared creep-
ing wars that start and build before Congress or the public are fully aware.").
65. 50 U.S.C. § 1542.
66. Id. § 1543.
67. Id. § 1544(b).
68. Letter from Joseph E. Macmanus, Acting Assistant Sec'y, Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of State, and Elizabeth L. King, Assistant Sec'y, Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Def., to John
Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives 25 (June 15, 2011), available at
1208 [Vol. I111: 1195
A Time for Presidential Power?
Koh's testimony provides the most complete recitation of the Obama
Administration's analysis and focuses on four factors that distinguish the
fighting in Libya (or at least the United States' participation) from "hostili-
ties": the scope of the mission, the exposure of U.S. forces, the risk of
escalation, and the nature of the tactics to be used. First, "the mission is lim-
ited."7° That is, the objectives of the overall campaign led by the North
American Treaty Organization ("NATO") were confined to a "civilian pro-
tection operation ... implementing a U.N. Security Council resolution."'"
Second, the "exposure" of the U.S. forces involved was narrow-the con-
flict did not "involve active exchanges of fire with hostile forces" in ways
that would endanger U.S. service members' safety.
7 2 Third, the fact that the
"risk of escalation [was] limited" weighed in favor of not categorizing the
conflict as "hostilities. '7 3 Finally, the "military means" the United States
used in Libya were limited in nature.7 4 The majority of missions were fo-
cused on "providing intelligence capabilities and refueling assets."
7 5 Those
American flights that were air-to-ground missions were a mix of suppres-
sion-of-enemy-air-defenses operations to enforce a no-fly zone and strikes
by armed Predator drones. 76 As a point of comparison, Koh noted that "the
total number of U.S. munitions dropped has been a tiny fraction of the num-
ber dropped in Kosovo. ' 77 With the exception of this final factor, these con-
considerations are quite similar to the factors that define whether a conflict
is a "war" for constitutional purposes.
78
The result of this reasoning is a substantially relaxed restraint on presi-
dential authority to use force abroad going forward. As armed drones begin
http://www.scribd.com/doc/58047625/United-States-Activities-in-Libya-
6 -15-11 (including
accompanying report UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES IN LIBYA (2011)).
69. Libya and War Powers Hearing, supra note 51, at 89 (statement of Harold Hongju
Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State).
70. Id. at 14.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 15.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 16.
76. Id.
77. Id. This is a particularly misleading comparison, as many of the munitions dropped
in Kosovo were either of the "dumb" variety or very early versions of "smart" GPS-guided
weapons, which required many more weapons per target to achieve a desired result than the
more modem weapons used in Libya. See W.J. Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionality During
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 489, 489 (2001) (put-
ting the number of precision weapons dropped at 35 percent of over 23,000 during the Kosovo
operation).
Additionally, while the United States itself may not have dropped substantial numbers of
munitions in Libya, the United States provided a substantial number of the munitions our
NATO allies dropped. See Eric Schmitt, NATO Finds Crucial Flaws in Libya Action, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2012, atAl.
78. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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to make up a larger portion of the United States' arsenal,79 and as other pro-
tective technologies, such as standoff munitions80 and electronic warfare
techniques, gain traction, it is far more likely that the "exposure" of U.S.
forces will decrease substantially. The force used in Yemen and the Horn of
Africa is illustrative of this new paradigm where U.S. service members are
not "involve[d] [in] active exchanges of fire with hostile forces,"81 but rather
machines use force by acting as human proxies. To the same point, if the
"military means" used in Libya are markers of something short of "hostili-
ties," the United States is only likely to see the use of those means increase
in the coming decades. Pressing the logic of Koh's testimony, leeway for
unilateral executive action will increase as the makeup of our arsenal con-
tinues to modernize.8
2
Dudziak worries about the invocation of "wartime" as an argument for
the perpetual exercise of extraordinary powers. The Libya scenario, of
course, is somewhat different-the president has argued that the absence of
''war" leaves him a residuum of power such that he may use force abroad
without congressional input. The two positions are of a piece, though.
Dudziak argues that legacy conceptions of "wartime" and "peacetime" have
left us vulnerable to the former's use, in and of itself, as a reason for in-
creased executive power. Such literal thinking-that "war" is something
specific or that the word "hostilities" has certain limits-also opens the door
to the Obama Administration's defense of its position on Libya. And looking
at the substance of that position leaves much to be desired.
Both Koh's testimony and the OLC memo pay lip service to the idea that
the policy considerations underlying their position are consistent with the
policy considerations of the Framers with respect to the Declare War Clause
and Congress with respect to the War Powers Resolution. But the primary, if
not the only, consideration mentioned is the loss of U.S. forces. That con-
cern is front and center when analyzing the "exposure" of service
79. See Spencer Ackerman & Noah Shachtman, Almost I in 3 U.S. Warplanes Is a Robot,
WIRED (Jan. 9, 2012, 1:31 PM), http://www.wired.con/dangerroom/2012/01/drone-report/.
80. See, e.g., John Croft, USAF Sets 2013 Entry for Extended-Range JASSM,
FLIGHTGLOBAL (June 4, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.flightgloba.com/news/articles/usaf-
sets-2013-entry-for-extended-range-jassm-342713/.
81. Libya and War Powers Hearing, supra note 51, at 14 (statement of Harold Hongju
Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State).
82. See Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in
Libya Operation, N.Y TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A 16. Savage and Landler note that
Jack L. Goldsmith, who led the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel during the
Bush administration, said the Obama theory would set a precedent expanding future
presidents' unauthorized war-making powers, especially given the rise of remote-
controlled combat technology. "The administration's theory implies that the president
can wage war with drones and all manner of offshore missiles without having to bother
with the War Powers Resolution's time limits," Mr. Goldsmith said.
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members,8 3 and it is also on display with respect to discussions about the
nature and scope of an operation.' This is not the only policy consideration
that one might intuit from those two provisions, however. Using lethal force
abroad is a very serious matter, and the U.S. polity might rationally want
input from the more representative branch in deciding when, where, and
how that force is used in its name. In that same vein, permitting one individ-
ual to embroil the nation in foreign conflicts-limited or otherwise-
without the input of another coequal branch of government is potentially
dangerous."s
As Dudziak's framework highlights the limits of the Obama Administra-
tion's argument for expansive power, so does the Administration's novel
dissection of "hostilities" illustrate the limits of Dudziak's analysis. Dudziak
presents a narrative arc bending toward the expansion of wartime and, as a
result, increased presidential power. That is not the case with Libya: the
president finds power in "not war" rather than in "wartime." If the American
public is guilty, as Dudziak asserts, of using the outmoded and misleadingly
concrete terminology of "wartime" to describe an increasingly complex
phenomenon, Dudziak herself is guilty of operating within a paradigm
where wartime necessarily equals more executive power (than does "not
war"), a paradigm that has been supplanted by a more nuanced reality. Alt-
83. See, e.g., Libya and War Powers Hearing, supra note 51, at 15 (statement by Harold
Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State) ("The Congress that adopted the War Powers
Resolution was principally concerned with the safety of U.S. forces... ).
84. See, e.g., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, supra note 51, at *9. As part of
its advisory opinion justifying the Obama Administration's actions with regard to Libya, the
Office of Legal Counsel noted that
"[i]n deciding whether prior Congressional authorization for the Haitian deployment was
constitutionally necessary," we observed, "the President was entitled to take into account
the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the planned deployment, and in particular
the limited antecedent risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed
resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the deployment."
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op.
O.L.C. 173, 179 (1994)).
85. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 6 THE WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1790-1802, at 312 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) ("The constitution
supposes, what the History of all [Governments] demonstrates, that the [Executive] is the
branch of power most interested in war, [and] most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied
care, vested the question of war in the [Legislature]."); The Debates in the Convention of the
State of Pennsylvania on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS REC-
OMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 528 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) (statement of James Wilson) ("This system will not hurry us into war;
it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body
of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the
legislature. ); THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, DECIDING TO USE FORCE ABROAD: WAR
POWERS IN A SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES 1 (2005), available at http://www.
constitutionproject.org/pdf/28.pdf ("The framers gave Congress the power to declare war to
ensure that the decision to initiate hostilities would not be made by a single person, but instead
collectively by a deliberative and politically accountable judgment of the legislature.").
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hough Dudziak identifies the dangers of manipulating the boundaries of
wartime, her catalog of manipulations remains incomplete because of the
inherent limits of her framework.
This realization does not detract from Dudziak's warnings about the per-
ils of endless wartime, however. Indeed, the powers that President Obama
has claimed seem, perhaps, more palatable after a decade in which war has
been invoked as an argument for many executive powers that would, in other
eras, seem extraordinary. Though he has not explicitly invoked war during
the Libya crisis, President Obama has certainly shown a willingness to ma-
nipulate its definition in the service of expanded executive power in ways
that seem sure to increase "war's presence as an ongoing feature of Ameri-
can democracy" (p. 136).
CONCLUSION
Dudziak presents a compelling argument and supports it well. War Time
is potent as a rhetorical device and as a way to frame decisionmaking. This
is especially so for the executive branch of the U.S. government, for which
wartime has generally meant increased, and ever more expansive, power. As
the United States continues to transit an era in which the lines between
"war" and "peace" become increasingly blurred and violent adversaries are
a constant, the temptation to claim wartime powers-to render the extraor-
dinary ordinary-is significant.
This Notice has argued that, contrary to Dudziak's concerns, the tempta-
tion is not absolute. Indeed, in some instances-notably, detention
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan-we are still able to differentiate be-
tween "war" and "peace" in ways that have hard legal meaning for the
actors involved. And, importantly, the executive still feels compelled to
abide by these distinctions and act in accordance with the law rather than
claim wartime exceptionalism.
That the temptation is not absolute, however, does not mean that it is not
real or that Dudziak's concerns have not manifested themselves. This de-
tachment of expansive power from temporally bound periods has opened the
door for, and in some ways incentivized, limiting wartime rather than ex-
panding it. While President Obama has recognized the legal constraints that"war" imposes, he has also followed in the footsteps of executives who have
attempted to manipulate the definition of "war" itself (and now the defini-
tion of "hostilities") in order to evade those constraints as much as possible.
To the extent he has succeeded in that evasion, he has confirmed what seems
to be Dudziak's greatest fear: that "[m]ilitary engagement no longer seem[s]
to require the support of the American people, but instead their inattention"
(p. 132).
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